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Abstract 
 
The paper argues that the networked firms have an advantage in securing bank 
finance in countries with weak legal and judicial institutions. An analysis of recent 
BEEPS data from sixteen CEE transition countries lends some support to this 
hypothesis. Firms affiliated to business associations are more likely to have bank 
finance while small and medium firms are less likely to secure it. Importance of being 
associated with business networks is particularly evident among firms who borrow 
from foreign banks, as the latter attempt to hedge risk in an uncertain environment. 
Significance of business networking however vanishes if institutional quality 
improves. 
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The Value of Business Networks: 
An Analysis of Firm Financing in Transition Countries 
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Networks  and  informal  relationships  are  often  central  to  functioning  of  many 
organisations  and  management  activities,  especially  in  transition  and  emerging 
economies  with  imperfect  and  missing  markets  as  well  as  weak  legal  and  judicial 
institutions  (e.g.,  Banerjee  and  Munshi,  2004;  Fishman  and  Khanna,  2004).  Recent 
transition  literature  however  emphasizes  the  lack  of  social  capital  and  networking  in 
many central and eastern European (CEE) countries, commonly attributed to the so called 
dictatorship theory (e.g., see Raiser 1999, Paldam and Svedsen, 2000, 2001). The existing 
literature has largely focused on measuring the stock of social capital, determinants of 
social capital and also its impact on economic development and growth in the region, 
usually  at  the  national  level.  Cross-country  studies  have  generally  found  that  active 
membership in organization is associated with higher economic growth (e.g., see Knack 
and Keefer, 1997; Whiteley 2000). It is however important to understand the possible 
micro-economic mechanism through which social network could affect economic growth 
and  development  and  the  literature  is  thin  in  this  respect.  The  present  paper  aims  to 
bridge  this  gap  of  the  literature  and  explores  the  role  of  business  networks  on  firm 
financing in a group of sixteen CEE countries. 
Even after a decade of reform, there is a growing feeling that the reforms have failed 
to spur adequately the development of banking in the CEE countries. Despite widespread 
reforms, use of external finance remains rather limited (16% of our sample firms had 
access to some bank finance), even by the standard of other developing and emerging 
economies.  This  necessitates  a  deeper  understanding  of  the  financing  and  growth 
prospects of firms, especially SMEs in transition countries.  
We  know  little  about  firms’  financing  choices  in  CEE  countries.  Fries  and  Taci 
(2002) examine the limits to banking reform while Klapper, Sarria-Allende, and Sulla 
(2002) have highlighted the financial constraint faced by the SMEs. De Haas et al. (2007) 
specifically examine bank’s customer choice in transition countries and identify the lack 
of coverage of foreign and large domestic banks to offer loans to SMEs. The present  
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paper goes beyond this literature with a view to identify the factors responsible for firms’ 
limited access to bank finance in a group of sixteen transition countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEE).  
Our analysis not only links to the literature on market imperfections, but also to the 
more recent literature on institutions and the value of social capital. Capital markets in 
transition  countries  are  far  from  being  perfect.  There  are  not  only  problems  of 
information/incentives, but also those of weak legal and judicial institutions; as a result, 
lender’s and creditors’ rights are not always protected. In this environment, networks of 
informal  relationships  tend  to  prevail  in  many  business  activities.  Recent  empirical 
studies  in  the  organizational  behaviour  literature  suggest  that  these  networks  are  a 
response  to  inadequate  institutional  support  (e.g.,  Boisot  and  Child,  1996),  especially 
attributable to a lack of legal infrastructure that guarantees written contracts and private 
property. Lenders and borrowers often cultivate personal relationships to substitute for a 
stable  legal  and  regulatory  environment.  Our  analysis  particularly  focuses  on  the 
importance  of  firm’s  affiliation  to  business  association  in  ensuring  access  to  external 
finance, especially bank finance.  
The  analysis  is  developed  in  two  steps:  (i)  we  examine  the  determinants  of  firm 
financing choices (e.g., between/among internal finance, bank finance, non-bank finance, 
and stock market credit); (ii) we also examine firm’s choice of bank types (state, private 
domestic  and  foreign  for  example).  Other  things  equal,  our  central  hypothesis  is 
concerned with the role of business networking (formal and informal) on firm financing 
in general and bank financing in particular. These issues are especially important in the 
context of the on-going banking reforms and also the trade-off between bank-based and 
market-based finance in the region. Given that these countries are undergoing radical 
institutional restructuring, it is also important that the informal institutions (e.g., some 
business networks) remain compatible with the formal institutions so as to minimise the 
possible costs of corruption and tax evasion.  
Note  however  that  firm’s  affiliation  to  a  business  networks  is  unlikely  to  be 
exogenous as networked firms are unlikely to be a random sample of all sample firms. 
Hence  one  needs  to  correct  for  the  possible  endogeneity  bias.  Given  the  data  at  our  
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access,  we  adopt  two  possible  approaches.  First,  we  obtain  the  predicted  value  of 
business association membership using first stage regression and use this as an instrument 
for firm’s financial choice regressions (i) and (ii) described above. Second, BEEPS data 
has a small panel element where a small fraction of sample firms were interviewed in 
both 2002 and 2005 (see further discussion in section 3). This allows us to use 2002 and 
2005 BEEPS panel data fixed effects estimates to check the robustness of our cross-
section estimates.  
There is evidence from our analysis that younger small and medium sized enterprises 
are less likely to be networked in our sample countries while firms’ access to bank loans, 
is  significantly  influenced  by  the  firm’s  affiliation  to  business  networks,  other  things 
equal. In particular, networked firms are about 7 percentage point more likely to obtain 
bank finance. The latter is especially evident in the firms’ access to loans from foreign 
banks (in comparison to those from domestic state or private banks), perhaps highlighting 
foreign banks’ attempt to reduce agency costs in a region with weak legal and judicial 
institutions. In the process, small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) are discriminated 
against, forcing them to rely on internal finance or no finance at all. Thus bank reforms 
remain lopsided in the sample countries. 
The chapter is developed as follows. Section 2 explains the analytical issues and 
identifies  the  central  hypotheses  while  section  3  describes  the  data  and  explains  the 
empirical methodology. Sections 4 analyses the results and the final section concludes. 
 
 
2. ANALYTICAL ISSUES 
Efficient allocation of resources is central to an understanding of economic growth. In a 
perfectly competitive world without any information problems, resources are allocated 
optimally through market mechanism so that the Pareto optimality holds good. Thus, in a 
perfect capital market, capital is allocated competitively, attaining its optimal allocation 
where the marginal product of capital is equal to the market interest rate so that market  
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interest rate will be the same across all alternative uses. However, Pareto optimality is 
lost if there are market imperfections. 
Capital  markets  in  developing  and  transition  countries  often  suffer  from  various 
imperfections. There are problems of information and incentives and also those of weak 
legal and judicial framework, giving rise to agency problems. The borrowers approach 
financial  institutions  with  a  view  to  borrowing  funds  to  invest,  but  the  financial 
institutions (lenders) can not be sure as to who the best borrower is. Furthermore, even 
after loans are issued, the financial institutions cannot be certain that there would not be 
any strategic default. The financial institutions (lenders) thus have the three-fold task of 
selecting  the  best  borrower,  ensuring  efficient  use  of  the  loan,  and  also  ensuring  re-
payment of the loan. This is achieved by screening and monitoring borrowers, and also 
by imposing collateral requirement on potential borrowers before they can be considered 
for loans from the financial institutions. Collateral requirements differ in size and quality 
and are therefore not uniform across financial institutions or borrowers as in most cases it 
is dependent on the size of the loan being requested, the firm size
1 etc. Consequently 
there may arise different non-market mechanisms that we explore below.  
 
2.1.  Business Networks 
An  understanding  of  personalized  exchange  is  central  to  an  understanding  of  the 
institutional approach to the study of economic development and growth (e.g., see North, 
1990).  
In many emerging economies we observe predominance of informal networks in 
organizing different kinds of exchanges. These networks usually involve an exchange of 
favors, making business easier for the members. While exchange within the networks 
does not rely on explicit written contracts, relationships between the members are guided 
by norms/conventions; norms are nothing but the desirable behaviour subject to sanctions 
in a community (Kandori, 1992).  
  Affiliation to a business association may influence economic activity. Business 
groups are common form of business association in many emerging economies. They are 
                                                 
1 See Beck, Demirguc-kunt, Maksimovic & Vojislav, (2002)  
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a  collection  of  legally  distinct  firms  tied  together  and  coordinating  on  their  actions. 
Member firms are linked in a complex manner, e.g, through pyramidal holding, cross 
ownership or common directorates (Samphantharak, 2002). Fisman and Khanna (2004) 
suggested that business groups play a role in aiding the economy where social provision 
of services falls short of the required level and are observed to provide an organizational 
structure that is better suited to dealing with the poor availability of basic inputs and 
services
2 (at the cost of non-business group firms in a resource constrained economy).  
Furthermore, group affiliates usually share a common brand identity (e.g, Salim group in 
Indonesia, the Tata group in India, and Samsung in Korea), and may draw on a common 
labour pool. There could also be simpler business association of firms working together, 
involving exchange of favours which make doing businesses easier for those within the 
network. Granovetter (1994) among others shows recognition for the social mechanism in 
the form of the common family bond in family owned businesses that acts to reduce the 
likelihood  of  reneging  of  contracts.  Kali  (1999)  and  Ghatak  and  Kali  (2000,  2001) 
however  argued  that  while  affiliation  to  business  networks  may  facilitate  business 
activities  of  networked  firms,  it  could  be  inefficient  from  a  general  equilibrium 
perspective.  
 
2.2. Firm-Bank Ownership Matching  
In  emerging  markets  bank  finance  dominates  (relative  to  the  market  finance). 
Banks/financial institutions differ in ownership, as they may be, foreign owned, privately 
owned  or  state  government  owned.  Borrowers  too  may  differ  not  only  in  terms  of 
ownership;  many  firms  are  closely  held,  often  by  strong  families,  and  government 
interference is usually a pervasive feature. In the presence of market imperfections in 
countries with weak institutions, one possible way to reduce agency costs would be to 
adhere  to  ownership  matching  between  firms  and  banks.  For  instance,  Berger  et  al. 
(2006), highlight the aspect ‘firm-bank ownership matching’ in India. Thus one could 
observe foreign-owned banks serving foreign-owned firms and by extension, state-owned 
firms  banking  with  state-owned  banks,  and  private  domestic  firms  having  banking 
                                                 
2 The ability to shift resources across units is used by a diversified business group to its advantage to 
consolidate its market power across industries (See Cestone and Fumagalli 2001).  
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relationship with private domestic banks. EBRD (2006) observe  a form of bank-firm 
matching  between  large  firms  and  foreign  banks  in  a  selected  number  of  transition 
countries. The latter has been attributed to the fact that foreign banks operating in a host 
country tend to lack information on credit-worthiness of local firms, and so to hedge their 
potential risk of lending to a bad borrower firm, they may choose to serve large firms 
with more transparent accounting standards and whose credit worthiness can quite easily 
be assessed. Alternatively, foreign banks may choose those domestic firms who have 
previously established some international links by virtue of their import/export activities 
(Bonin  and  Leven,  1996).  Thus  the  impact  of foreign  banks  is  likely  to  be  larger  in 
sectors  where  information  asymmetries  are  lower  (as  a  way  of  avoiding  adverse 
selection).  
 
3. DATA  
Our  analysis  is  primarily  based  on  the  EBRD  Business  Environment  and  Enterprise 
Performance  Survey  (BEEPS)  2005  data.
3  Business  Environment  and  Enterprise 
Performance  Survey  (“BEEPS”)  is  a  joint  initiative  of  the  European  Bank  for 
Reconstruction and Development (“EBRD”) and the World Bank Group. The survey, 
was administered to a random sample of 11814 enterprises in 28 countries of Central and 
Eastern  Europe  (“CEE”)  (including  Turkey)  and  the  Commonwealth  of  Independent 
States (“CIS”), to examine the quality of the business environment as determined by a 
wide range of interactions between firms and the state, to assess the environment for 
private enterprise and business development. For further details of the data, see EBRD 
(2005). 
 
3.1. Data Description 
For the purpose of our study we create a sub-sample comprising only of firms in the 
central and eastern European (CEE) countries. This gives rise to a sample of 5597 firms, 
representing  about  58%  of  all  firms  that  participated  in  the  survey.  The  country 
                                                 
3 Later we shall make use of 2002 and 2005 BEEPS data to check the robustness of our cross-section 
estimates using 2005 BEEPS data.  
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distribution of our sample of firms is as shown in Table 1, which suggests that firms in 
Poland make up the largest proportion of our sample at 17.4%, followed by Turkey, 
Hungary and Romania. 
BEEPS  data  allow  us  to  classify  firms  by  its  ownership  structure,  namely, 
individual  ownership,  family  ownership,  foreign  ownership,  and  state  ownership;  we 
could also identify the ownership structure (e.g., foreign, private domestic, state) of banks 
lending to the sample firms. Secondly, we classify firm size into three categories ‘small’, 
‘medium’ and ‘large’ according to labour force size information contained in the BEEPS 
data.
4  We  merge  small  and  medium  sized  firms  together  to  identify  their  financing 
choices; about 91% of sample firms are small and medium sized enterprises (see Table 
1); in other words only about 9% sample firms could be classified as ‘large’ according to 
their employment size. Rise of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in CEE countries 
could be attributed to the break-up of large state-owned enterprises. 
Following Klapper et al (2002), firms with an age of 10 years or less, i.e, those 
that came into existence after the year 1995, were defined as ‘young’. 41% of small firms 
in our sample fall into the category of young firms. It also means that large firms are not 
necessarily old firms.  
Table 2 shows the sources of firm financing for new investment for sample firms 
in each of the selected countries. In general, a majority of firms in the sample countries 
tend  to  finance  new  investment  through  internal  finance.  Bank  finance  is  the  second 
important source of firm finance followed by non-bank finance and equity finance.  
Table 3 shows firm’s choice of banks by ownership structure. Of the firms that 
borrow  from  banks,  borrowing  from  local  commercial  banks  is  most  common, 
irrespective  of  firm  ownership  (state-owned,  foreign-owned  or  individual  and  family 
owned).  However,  individual  and  family  owned  firms  use  domestic  banks  relatively 
more. While borrowing from state-banks is not so common, relatively higher proportion 
of state-owned firms borrow from state banks. Borrowing from foreign banks too is not 
very common and again foreign firms are relatively more likely to use foreign banks. 
                                                 
4 Other studies notably, Bevan and Danbolt (2004) have used log of sales to proxy for this and Gonzalez et 
al (2007) used natural log of firm total assets.   
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  BEEPS data provides information on whether a firm is affiliated to any business 
association. Using this information we could classify firms into networked and others. 
Table  4  compares  selected  characteristics  of  networked  firms  with  other  firms  and 
highlights some important characteristics of networked firms. In general, older state firms 
and also foreign firms are more likely to belong to some business network while young 
SMEs  in  the  domestic  private  sector  are  significantly  less  likely  to  be  networked. 
Compared  to  non-networked  firms,  mean  research  and  development  spending  of 
networked firms are significantly higher. Thus, networked firms tend to be in a more 
advantageous position among all sample firms. Networked firms may benefit in a number 
of  ways  from  their  affiliation  to  the  business  association  including  lobbying  the 
government (40% of networked firms), resolving disputes (33% of networked firms), 
information  on  domestic/international  product  and  input  markets  (about  80%  firms), 
accrediting  quality  standards  of  the  product  (70%  of  networked  firms)  and  getting 
information on government regulation (about 80% of networked firms). The latter in turn 
corroborates the possible endogeneity of the business association membership variable. 
 
3.2. Institutions and Inter-Country Variation 
The  harmonious  co-existence  of  firms  and  financial  institutions  is  dependent  on  the 
prevailing legal and institutional structures to safeguard and enforce creditors’ rights and 
to enforce contracts. This has been highlighted in the recent literature. For example, La 
porta,  Lopez-de-Silanes,  Shleifer,  &  Vishny  (1997)  find  evidence  that  the  legal 
environment as described by both legal rules and their enforcement matters for the size 
and extent of a country's capital markets. Investor protection was observed to be weak in 
countries with a marked departure of its legal origin from common law
5, and hence such 
countries had smaller and narrower capital markets. La porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Pop-
Eleches,  &  Shleifer  (2004)  find  that  judicial  independence  is  an  important  source  of 
economic freedom, which explains part of the persistent finding that such freedom is 
greater in the common law countries. Using a sample of firms drawn from developing 
and developed countries, Beck et al (2002) find that all types of corporate constraints 
                                                 
5 This is English law made by judges and subsequently incorporated into legislature   
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including those relating to financial, legal, and corruption do affect firm growth rates 
adversely. The extent of the effect depends very much on firm size: The smallest firms 
are most adversely affected by all these constraints. In addition, they show that firms that 
operate in countries with underdeveloped financial and legal systems and higher levels of 
corruption tend to be more constrained in general. The latter appears to relate to earlier 
work by Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998), which stressed the importance of the 
financial system and the rule of law for relaxing firms' external financing constraints and 
facilitating their growth. 
In central and eastern European and the Baltic States countries, privatisation and 
institutional  reform  in  the  banking  sector  have  advanced  in  step  with  the  state’s 
withdrawal from the direct provision of banking services and with progress in enterprise 
reform.  Shleifer  (1997)  argues  that  there  has  to  be  a  transition  of  government  for  a 
transition to a market economy to take place. This was described as de-politicization of 
the economy, whereby control over resource use and ownership is transferred exclusively 
to the private sector. Government role will then be to provide the necessary institutions to 
support the market economy. This will be the creation of laws and legal institutions that 
protect  private  property,  enforce  contracts  between  private  parties,  but  also  limit  the 
ability of officials to prey on private property; and also include the creation of regulating 
institutions that deal with competition, securities markets, banking, trade, patents and so 
on. A similar view is shared by Rodrik (1997), who draws from the experience of the 
East Asian growth miracle, and emphasizes the need for government interventions for 
transition economies.  
The  2007  International  Property  Rights  Index  (IPRI)  as  constructed  by  Horst 
(2007)  provides  useful  information  on  both  physical  and  intellectual  property  rights 
standards in many countries of the world and thus allows us to compare the institutional 
development  in  the  CEE  countries  to  those  for  the  rest  of  the  world.  It  has  three 
components,  namely,  legal  and  political  environment  (LP),  physical  property  rights 
(PPR), and Intellectual property rights (IPR) – for details about their construction see 
Horst  (2007).  The  IPRI  ranking  compares  countries  according  to  the  strength  and 
effectiveness of their property rights protection. An overview of regional international 
property rights (IPRI) indices is presented in Table 5.   
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It is evident that the CEE countries and Russia region are statistically the third 
lowest ranked region in terms of all the four above enumerated measures – legal and 
political Environment (LP), physical property rights (PPR), intellectual property rights 
(IPR), international property Rights index (IPRI). Furthermore average values of these 
measures for CEE countries and Russia are almost half of those of Western Europe. This 
evidently suggests a number of ills with their institutional infrastructure and corporate 
governance  standards.  However,  this  may  be  associated  with  the  fact  that  Russia  is 
included in the list of CEE countries, and being a special case of very low corporate 
governance standards and infrastructure in general, perhaps it is not surprising, as its 
measure has an overbearing impact on the measures of the CEE countries. 
Considering the individual countries, there is evidence of a wider dispersion in the 
institutional quality and reform indices among the 16 countries in our sample. It follows 
from Table 6 that these countries are  at different levels of reform  and we observe  a 
bimodal distribution. Many CEE countries still have a considerable way to reach the 
international  levels.  This  includes  FYR  Macedonia,  Bosnia  Herzegovina,  Serbia, 
Montenegro, and Albania. Only one-quarter of the countries actually attain the highest 
value 4 of the Bank reform index and include Croatia, Hungary, Czech Republic and 
Estonia. In terms of competition policy only five countries, namely, Poland, Hungary, 
Slovak Republic, Lithuania, and Estonia actually attained the highest level of competition 
policy reform. In terms of institutional quality, the country with the best institutions was 
Hungary  at  8.7  closely  followed  by  Slovenia,  Poland,  Czech  Republic  and  Estonia 
respectively  at  8.5,  7.0, 6.8  and  6.1.  Among  the  selected  CEE  countries,  Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina seems to have the worst institutions, followed by Albania and Romania. We 
shall examine the extent to which some of these institutional indices may affect firms’ 
financing choices in transition. 
 
 
4. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
This section explains the methodology to achieve the two objectives of the study as set 
out in the introduction.   
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4.1  Choice of firm financing 
Our first objective is to analyse firm’s financing choices FINNI for new investment, as 
defined as follows: 
FINNI   = 0 if no finance is used 
   = 1 if internal finance >0 
= 2 if Bank debt >0 
= 3 if non-bank credit > 0 
= 4 if Equity > 0            (1) 
Given the discrete and unordered nature of the variable, we apply a multinomial logit 
model to determine FINNI.  
The multinomial Logit model is used where a choice is to be made from a number 
of alternatives and the data to be analyzed are individual specific.  The choice sets, which 
are analyzed with this model are unordered. The model is as illustrated below: 
e
e y
x
x
j ob
i i
i Jj
k
i β
β
'
'
5
0
) ( Pr
∑ =
= =    j = 0, 1,…, J    (1.1) 
Where Y is the discrete dependent variable and x’s are the explanatory variables; j is the 
number of choices available to the individual as specified in (1). J=4 in our context. 
Equation (1.1) is estimated for each choice. The estimated equations then provide 
a set of probabilities for the J+1 choices for a decision maker with characteristics X. 
Maximum likelihood is then used to solve the set of equations that arise to obtain the 
probabilities of each choice. This is done by first deriving the log-likelihood function, 
which  is  then  maximized  to  obtain  the  maximum  likelihood  estimators.  The  log-
likelihood is derived by defining for each individual, dij = 1 if alternative j is chosen by 
individual i, and 0 if not for the j-1 possible outcomes. Then for each i, one and only one 
of the dij’s is 1. The log-likelihood is as below: 
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            (1.2)  
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The derivatives obtained by maximizing the above function have the simple form of: 
x p d i ij ij
L
) (
ln
− ∑ =
∂
∂
β
  for j = 1,…, J          (1.3) 
The negative sign of the hessian, obtained from taking the second derivative of the above 
function confirms that the estimates obtained are the optimum values (Greene, 2003). 
This model has also been employed by quite a number of studies including Berger et al 
(2006) and Detriagache et al (2000). 
  The set of explanatory variables x are chosen not only to reflect the hypotheses of 
interest, but also to be compatible with the existing literature. A number of studies on 
banking  relationships  have  recognized  the  importance  of  business  association 
membership  such  as  Detriagache  et  al  (2000),  Ghatak  and  Kali,  (2001),  Berger  et  al 
(2006), Chang (2007). We thus hypothesize that firms affiliated to business associations 
are more likely to access bank finance. 
  Ownership structure of both firms and banks could play an important role especially 
in the context of networking in an imperfect world, e.g., see Berger et al (2006) and 
Detriagache et al (2000). To this end, we include controls for state-owned firms, private 
domestic firms and foreign firms. 
Both  firm  size  and  age  are  observed  to  determine  a  firm’s  choice  of  finance. 
Klapper et al (2002), Kumar (2007), Berger and Udell (1995), Beck et al (2002) confirm 
this. Thus we expect young SMEs to have less bank finance. While other studies have 
used log of sales e.g., Bevan and Danbolt (2004), and natural logarithm of the book value 
of the total property assets (e.g. Ooi, 2000), we use labour force size to proxy for firm 
size as explained in section 3.1.  
  Other  control  variables  include  growth  of  prior  year  fixed  assets,  prior  year 
research and development spending. Given the diverse set of countries in our sample, we 
also include some country-level institutional controls including EBRD competition policy  
 
13 
index, and institutional quality index
6 that may also influence firms’ financing choices 
(see discussion in section 3.2). 
Since the coefficient estimates do not reflect the marginal effects; we determine it 
separately as the partial derivative of the expected value of the dependent variable with 
respect to the particular explanatory variable. 
 
4.2  Firms’ choice of banks  
Our  second  objective  is  to  determine  firm’s  choices  of  banks  belonging  to  different 
ownership categories, namely, state bank, private domestic commercial bank, and foreign 
bank. This results in the construction of the following dependent variable: 
BANKFCH   = 0 if firm has no bank loan  
            = 1 if firm has loan from state banks  
           = 2 if firm has loan from private domestic commercial banks  
           = 3 if firm has loan from foreign banks 
Given the unordered nature of this choice variable, we use a second multinomial logit 
model to determine BANKFCH in terms of a set of explanatory variables x2 and also 
determine the marginal effects for each of the included explanatory variables x2.  
Our first hypothesis here is to check if a firm’s affiliation to business association 
is  particularly  important  for  loans  from  a  particular  type  of  bank  classified  by  its 
ownership (i.e., state, domestic private, foreign). This is closely related to the literature 
on  foreign  banks’  entry  in  developing  and  transition  economies  (e.g.,  see  Bonin  and 
Leven 1996; Bonin et al. 1998). In particular, there is suggestion that foreign banks tend 
to lend to borrowers with better accounting and reporting standards (and thus may prefer 
foreign firms) or with those firms who have established international links by virtue of 
their import/export activities. In an uncertain foreign environment thus foreign banks may 
choose networked firms with a view to lower their agency costs. 
A related hypothesis is to test whether there is a firm-bank ownership matching in 
our sample; in particular we examine whether foreign firms are more likely to borrow 
                                                 
6 The use of a composite variable such as institutional quality in our multinomial logit regression enables us 
to solve the problem of multicollinearity that would have resulted had we used individual country level 
indices.  
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from foreign banks while state-owned firms are more likely to borrow from state banks 
(Berger et al 2006).  
The set of explanatory variables x2 has some common variables as in x in section 
4.1  above;  for  example,  we  continue  to  include  control  for  SMEs,  young  firms, 
interaction  between  SME  and  young,  firm  ownership  type  and  firms’  affiliation  to 
business association. We also have a set of institutional control as before; but we now 
replace competition policy index by EBRD bank reform index, as we focus on banking 
relationship only.
7  
 
4.3. Addressing possible endogeneity of network affiliation 
A potential problem with the identification of networked firms is that firms’ affiliation to 
a business network is likely to be  endogenous. This is because firms  may  choose to 
belong to a network with a view to reap certain benefits (see discussion in section 3); thus 
networked firms are unlikely to be random among all sample firms. In other words, there 
remains an important selection problem to be addressed here. One option could be to 
generate an instrument for firm’s affiliation to a business network. To this end, we run a 
first stage probit regression to determine sample firm’s affiliation to a business network; 
we choose potentially time invariant explanatory variables like SME, young and firm 
ownership categories; Results of this regression are shown in Appendix Table A1. 
It  is  however  difficult  to  address  this  selection  issue  convincingly  in  a  single 
cross-section data-set that we have used so far. One possible alternative is to consider the 
panel data where we have information on firms in both 2002 and 2005, although the latter 
considerably reduces the sample size. Note however that the panel element of the BEEPS 
data includes only about 15.45% of our total observations in BEEPS 2005 used in our 
analysis. These firms are firms initially surveyed in the BEEPS 2002 round and then were 
re-surveyed in BEEPS 2005, having expressed a desire to be involved in the 2005 BEEPS 
round.
8 The firms were identified through a firm identity number allocated to such firms 
                                                 
7 We included all institutional variables in an alternative specification; but the competition index was never 
significant. Thus the final specification does not include competition index. 
8  Firms in Bosnia and Herzegovina, although surveyed in 2005, were either not surveyed in 2002 or 
refused to be involved in the BEEPS round of 2005 having participated in BEEPS 2002.  
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in  the  BEEPS  2005  survey  round.  In  particular  about  865  firms  in  fifteen  selected 
countries are in this panel, giving rise to 1730 observations in total for the two rounds 
considered. We construct very similar regression variables used in the main part of the 
analysis. Means and standard deviations of these variables are shown in Table A4, which 
highlights their comparability with 2005 data.  
One could use this panel data to estimate random effects binary probit model to 
determine  firm’s  choice of  banks  (state,  private commercial  and  foreign)  in  terms  of 
lagged value of business affiliation as one of the possible covariates X.  
i it it
it it it
u v
X Y
+ =
+ =
ε
ε β' *
 
We observe Yit = 1 if Y
*
it >0 and 0 otherwise where Y is the dependent variable of our 
choice. We choose three Ys pertaining to firm’s choice of state banks, private domestic 
banks and foreign banks (each of them being a binary variable) and run three random 
effects probit models (see discussion in section 4.3). There are two error terms in the 
model – one firm-specific (time invariant) ui and the other νit varies not only across firms 
but also over time. The model not only determines the parameter estimates β, but also the 
correlation ρ between ui and vit. 
An important assumption here is that the firm-specific error term, ui, is unrelated 
to  the  explanatory  variables,  xit,  so  that  the  conditional  distribution,  ƒ(ui|  xit).is  not 
dependent on xit. In other words, firm-specific fixed effects uis allow us to control for 
firm-specific unobserved variables. If however, we allow ui to be correlated with xit, we 
consider ui to be firm-specific unobserved heterogeneity and estimate the fixed effects 
logit  model  instead.  Naturally  the  time  invariant  factors  are  dropped  from  the  fixed 
effects model. In particular, we include firm’s association to business association and 
growth of fixed assets. Since it has been argued that business association membership has 
been  a  response  to  institutional  weakness,  we  also  include  an  interaction  between 
business association membership and institutional quality index in the fixed effects model 
and check for the significance of t-statistic of the interaction term.  In fact, statistical 
insignificance of the interaction term would highlight the fact that business association 
membership is not crucial for firm financing in countries with high quality institutions.    
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We  compare  the  fixed  and  random  effects  estimates  to  check  the  robustness  of  our 
estimates especially for assessing the role of business association. 
 
4.4.  Model specification 
In this section, we rationalize the choice of explanatory variables and  the underlying 
hypotheses for each regression described in sections 4.1 and 4.2. Note that while most 
variables are common in both regressions, there are some identifying variables that arise 
by the very nature of the dependent variable. Variable definitions and summary statistics 
(means and standard deviations) are depicted in Table 7 while model specifications are 
summarised in Table 8.  
  In  particular,  we  include  a  variable  indicating  small  and  medium  enterprises 
(SME), young firms, interaction between SME and young firms, private domestic firms, 
growth of prior year fixed assets, prior year research and development spending (e.g., see 
Elsas,  2005  and,  Detriagache  et  al  2000),  business  association  membership,  firm’s 
ownership structure (state, private domestic, foreign) and an institutional quality index in 
each of the three regressions. For obvious reasons, EBRD competition policy index is 
included only in firms’ financing choice regression while EBRD bank reform index is 
included in determining firms’ choice of banks. We use similar institutional variables as 
those used by Berger et al (2006), Beck, Demirguc-kunt & Maksimovic (2002), Fries and 
Taci  (2002)  to  control  for  the  firms  country  business  environment.  Both  regressions 
include control  for manufacturing sector,  which is the largest industrial sector in our 
sample. 
 
 
5.  RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
We outline the single cross-section results of our regressions with instrument for business 
association membership in Tables 9 and 10 while the uncorrected estimates are shown in 
Appendix  Tables  A2  and  A3.  A  comparison  of  instrumented  estimates  with  the 
uncorrected indicates biases if endogeneity of business association is not accounted for.  
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In particular while the uncorrected estimates suggest networked firms are 6.6 percentage 
point more likely to obtain bank finance (Table A2), instrumented estimates suggest that 
the premium is about 7.7 percentage point (Table 9). Finally Table 11 shows the panel 
logit fixed effects estimates for firms’ choice of private domestic and foreign banks (see 
section 4.3); corresponding random effects probit estimates are shown in Appendix Table 
A4. 
 
5.1.   Determinants of Firm Financing Choices for New Investment 
Our analysis in this section is couched in terms of the instrumented estimates and refers 
to  the  uncorrected  estimates  (Table  A2)  only  for  comparison.  The  multinomial  logit 
results for firm financing for new investment are summarised in Table 9 where firms not 
using  any  formal  source  of  finance  (i.e,  FINNI=0)  are  the  reference  category.  Our 
diagnostic  tests  confirm  the  validity  of  the  multinomial  logit  model.  In  particular, 
significance of the likelihood ratio chi-squared statistic confirms the goodness of fit of 
the estimated multinomial logit model. 
Given that the estimated coefficients do not reflect the marginal effects, estimated 
marginal effects are reported in the table, which enables us to examine the magnitude of 
the effect of each of the explanatory variables on the particular mode of firm financing 
for new investment.  
As  dummy  variables  taking  the  values  of  1  and  0  dominate  our  selection  of 
exogenous explanatory variables of interest, such as small and medium enterprises or 
foreign ownership of firms, their reported marginal effect is the difference in predicted 
value for the dependent variable (e.g., probability of firm financing by internal finance) 
for a dummy variable of 1 versus 0, with all other exogenous variables at their means. On 
the other hand, the marginal effects for the exogenous variables are the derivatives of the 
predicted dependent variable for small changes in the exogenous variables.   
These  estimates  are  generally  consistent  with  our  central  hypothesis  that 
affiliation to business networks significantly improves firms’ access to bank finance in a 
world with information asymmetry and other imperfections. Firms affiliated to business  
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associations are about seven percentage points more likely to access bank finance. After 
controlling for all other factors, state, private or foreign firms are less likely have access 
to bank finance. State firms are also significantly less likely to get non-bank credit.  
Firms  with  growing  fixed  assets  tend  to  have  more  bank  credit  while  R&D 
spending remains insignificant. Firm size is important too. SMEs are less likely to secure 
bank/non-bank loans and instead rely more on internal finance. However, firm age does 
not appear to be important here. 
Finally, there is some evidence of the role of institutions in securing external firm 
financing. In particular, firms from more competitive countries tend to rely more on bank 
and non-bank credit while those from countries with better institutions in general have 
some access to equity finance.  
 
5.2  Firm’s Choice of Banks 
As in the previous sub-section, we outline the marginal effects of our multinomial logit 
model regression results in Table 10. The reference category for our regression has been 
firms with no bank finance at all (i.e, BANKFCH =0). Our discussion in this section is 
couched in terms of the marginal effects of regression variables. Our diagnostic tests 
confirm the goodness of fit of the estimated multinomial logit model in this respect. 
  A positive role is observed for business association membership; the coefficient 
of business association membership is positive and significant for firms borrowing from 
foreign banks. In other words, affiliation to business association is conducive to securing 
loans particularly from foreign banks who face uncertain business conditions and weaker 
institutional environment in these group of transition countries. 
  It is evident that state banks’ role has been curtailed by the recent reform and as 
such state firms are less likely to borrow from all three categories (state, private domestic 
commercial, and foreign) of banks. However foreign firms and private domestic firms are 
only less likely to borrow from state banks, while their coefficients are insignificant for 
private domestic commercial bank and foreign bank.  In other words, there is no evidence  
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that state firms, private domestic firms, and foreign firms are more likely to go to state 
banks, private domestic commercial banks, and foreign banks respectively.  
The coefficient of growth of prior year fixed assets, while being positive for all 
bank categories, is significant only for loans from the private domestic commercial bank 
category; the latter reflects the importance of satisfying some efficiency requirement in 
the allocation of private commercial bank loans.  
After controlling for all other factors, it appears that SMEs are significantly less 
likely to borrow from private domestic and foreign banks; the latter may be associated 
with the barriers faced by SMEs such as collateral requirements as discussed by Berger 
and Udell (1995).  
Bank  reform  index  has  a  positive  effect  on  loans  from  foreign  as  well  as 
commercial banks. The latter highlights one positive consequence of bank reforms in 
these countries. However SMEs are less likely to secure loans from foreign banks even in 
countries with relatively better institutions. In other words, foreign banks tend to operate 
very cautiously in this region resulting in rather limited coverage, at least for business 
financing.  
 
5.3. Panel data estimates 
Finally, in an attempt to test the robustness of our estimates, we also estimate firm’s 
choice of bank loans (BANKFCH) using panel data. We tried to estimate three separate 
random  effects  probit  models  to  determine  firms’  loan  from  state  banks,  private 
commercial banks and foreign banks respectively. However, the model failed to run for 
firms’ choice of state banks; which is perhaps attributable to small proportion (less than 
5%)  of  firms  using  loans  from  state  banks.  Naturally  the  time  invariant  factors  are 
dropped from the fixed effects model. Fixed effects logit estimates are shown in Table 11 
while the corresponding probit random effects estimates are summarised in Appendix 
Table A5 where RHO is the estimated value of the share of the within firm variance in 
the model.  
  Both  fixed  and  random  effects  estimates  support  the  significance  of  business  
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association membership for obtaining loans from both private domestic and foreign banks 
in  our  sample.  Considering  the  fixed  effects  estimates,  one  could  suggest  that  a 
networked firm (relative to a non-networked firm) is 16 percentage points more likely to 
borrow from a private commercial banks; by the same token, a networked firm is 26 
percentage points more likely to borrow from foreign banks, even after controlling for all 
other possible covariates. Note also that compared to the cross-section estimates, panel 
data estimates highlight a stronger relationship between business networking and access 
to bank finance. Clearly the networking effect is more pronounced for loans from foreign 
banks  (relative  to  private  domestic  banks).  Taken  together,  there  is  suggestion  that 
foreign banks trade more carefully in these emerging economies with weak institutional 
environment  and  in  the  process,  networked  firms  are  likely  to  have  more  access  to 
foreign banks. While the networking effect is somewhat weaker, it is present also for 
loans from private domestic banks in the sample of CEE countries. Interpretation of the 
interaction term is also quite interesting; insignificance of the interaction term highlights 
that business association membership is no longer significant in firm’s access to loans 
from private domestic or foreign banks, if the institutional quality of the country is high, 
thus lending support to our central hypothesis.   
   Random effects estimates too are in line with the fixed effects estimates of business 
association  membership.  These  estimates  are  also  consistent  with  our  results  in  the 
previous section 5.2; in particular, there is no evidence of firm-bank ownership matching. 
State  firms  were  significantly  less  likely  to  borrow  from  state  banks
9  while  the 
coefficients  of  both  private  domestic  firms  and  foreign  firms  remain  insignificant  in 
regressions representing firms borrowing from private banks and foreign banks. Small 
and  Medium  enterprises  are  less  likely  to  borrow  from  private  domestic  commercial 
banks
10,  while  its  coefficient  is  not  significant  for  borrowing  from  foreign  banks. 
Efficiency considerations appear to govern private domestic commercial banks’ provision 
of credit to firms, as the coefficients of growth of prior year fixed assets and that of prior 
year  research  and  development  spending,  are  both  positive  and  significant.  The 
importance of CEE country reforms too appear to be highlighted in our results: as before 
                                                 
9 Contained in our state bank regression results,  which are not shown in our results 
10 A similar result was obtained for firms borrowing from state banks  
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bank reforms play a positive and significant role in ensuring access to loans from private 
domestic commercial banks. There is however no evidence that bank reforms have been 
associated  with  increased  loans  from  foreign  banks.  Interestingly,  better  quality 
institutions as such fail to ensure greater access to foreign bank credit.  
 
6.  CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
Financial  intermediation  may  not  always  guarantee  efficient  utilization  of  credit, 
especially if there are market imperfections and institutional weaknesses. In this respect, t 
present paper explores a possible mechanism through which social capital could affect 
financing  of  investment  and  thereby  encouraging  growth  of  business  enterprises;  in 
particular, the paper focuses on the role of business networks on firms’ access to bank 
finance in selected CEE countries.  
Following  the  recent  institutional  economics  literature  and  also  that  on 
organizational behaviour, we argue that informal networks are a response to inadequate 
institutions  and  imperfect  markets  that  persist  despite  ongoing  reforms.  Firms’ 
association  with  informal  business  networks  may  help  them  secure  bank  finances 
especially in transition and emerging economies. Results from our analysis do confirm 
the  positive  role  of  business  networks  for  network  participants.  In  particular  there  is 
evidence that affiliation to business association boosts networked firms’ access to bank 
loans. Positive role of networks for network participants is particularly evident for firms 
borrowing from private commercial banks and also foreign banks. In the process non-
networked small and medium enterprises are discriminated against. While bank reforms 
have been successful to discourage loans from state banks and encourage those from 
private domestic banks, it fails to have any perceptible effect to boost loans from foreign 
banks in our sample. These results appear to be robust to alternative specifications and 
sample choice. 
There is however no scope for complacency. Forming networks to secure bank 
loans and other business facilities may not necessarily be an efficient arrangement for the 
broader  economy,  as  it  may  promote  the  interests  of  those  networked  firms  who  are 
successful to belong to good networks through family/political connections or otherwise,  
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but are not necessarily more efficient firms. Thus contrary to the common wisdom, social 
capital may not necessarily be welfare improving. We hope future research will address 
this.  
As the efficiency of financial intermediation is dependent on how well banks are 
able to finance profitable investments by firm, policy should compel banks to properly 
screen firms through using asset based lending for large firms and credit scoring for small 
and  medium  firms,  and  development  of  adequate  rules  regulating  the  formation  of 
networks by firms so as to enable firms enjoy the full benefits of forming networks. 
Given that equity markets in the region tend to be underdeveloped, policies should be 
aimed  at  helping  the  vast  majority  of  small  and  medium  enterprises’  access  to  bank 
finance and thus boosting their investment and growth.   
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Distribution of firms across sample countries 
 
Country  Number of 
firms 
Percentage of 
Total 
observations 
Number of small 
and Medium 
firms (SMEs) 
SMEs as a 
proportion of 
total firms in 
each country 
FYR of Macedonia  200  3.6%  180  90.00% 
Serbia and 
Montenegro  300  5.4%  259  86.33% 
Albania  204  3.6%  189  92.65% 
Croatia  236  4.2%  203  86.02% 
Turkey  557  10.0%  504  90.48% 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina  200  3.6%  180  90.00% 
Slovenia  223  4.0%  195  87.44% 
Poland  975  17.4%  906  92.92% 
Hungary  610  10.9%  561  91.97% 
Czech rep  343  6.1%  316  92.13% 
Slovak rep  220  3.9%  198  90.00% 
Romania  600  10.7%  541  90.17% 
Bulgaria  300  5.4%  270  90.00% 
Latvia  205  3.7%  184  89.76% 
Lithuania  205  3.7%  185  90.24% 
Estonia  219  3.9%  198  90.41% 
Total  5597  100.0%  5069  90.57%  
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Table 2: Distribution of firms by source of financing for New Investment 
 
COUNTRY No Bank  Internal  Bank Non-bank  Equity  TOTAL
(coded 0) (coded 1) (coded 2) (coded 3) (coded 4)
FYROM (Macedonia) 100 
(50%)
74    (37%) 15 (7.5%)
7             
(3.5%)
4                
(2%)
200
Serbia and Montenegro 92    
(30.67%)
149 
(49.67%
43  
(14.33%)
14       
(4.67%)
2    
(0.67%)
300
Albania 31 
(15.20%)
111 
(54.41%)
56 
(27.45%)
6     
(2.94%)
0 204
Croatia 69 
(29.24%)
72 
(30.51%)
52 
(22.03%)
28 
(11.86%)
15    (6.36) 236
Turkey 231 
(41.47%)
156 
(28.01%)
21  
(3.77%)
20   
(3.59%)
129 
(23.16%)
557
Bosnia and herzegovina 102 
(51%)
57 (28.5%)
29 
(14.5%)
12       (6%) 0 200
Slovenia 72  
(32.29%)
73 
(32.74%)
57 
(25.56%)
20   
(8.97%)
1    
(0.45%)
223
Poland 188 
(19.28%)
521 
(53.44%)
148 
(15.18%)
105 
(10.77%)
13 
(1.33%)
975
Hungary 146 
(23.93%)
204 
(33.44%)
86 
(14.10%)
68 
(11.15%)
106 
(17.38%)
610
Czech rep 97 
(28.28%)
123 
(35.86%)
26 
(7.58%)
61 
(17.78%)
36 
(10.50%)
343
Slovak rep 68 
(30.91%)
80 
(36.36%)
16 
(7.27%)
31 
(14.09%)
25 
(11.36%)
220
Romania 106 
(17.67%)
296 
(49.33%)
102 
(17%)
93   
(15.5%)
3     
(0.5%)
600
Bulgaria 74 
(24.67%)
134 
(44.67%)
59 
(19.67%)
31 
(10.33%)
2    
(0.67%)
300
latvia 89 
(43.41%)
47 
(22.93%)
17 
(8.29%)
19   
(9.27%)
33 
(16.10%)
205
Lithuania 36 
(17.56%)
81 
(39.51%)
17 
(8.29%)
65 
(31.71%)
6    
(2.93%)
205
Estonia 62 
(28.31%)
75 
(34.25%)
20 
(9.13%)
59 
(26.94%)
3   
(1.37%)
219
TOTAL 1563 2253 764 639 378 5597
Note: Figures in brackets refer to number of firms in each category as a proportion of total firms in 
each country   27 
 
Table 3: Firms’ choice of banks (by bank ownership type) 
 
    Firm ownership 
Loans from  State-owned  Foreign  Individual/family  Other domestic 
firms (general 
public and domestic 
company) 
State bank (1)  11 (20.75%)  5 (6.94%)  97 (13.34%)  17 (16.19%) 
Local 
commercial 
bank (2) 
37 (69.81%)  47 (65.28%)  543 (74.69%)  71 (67.62%) 
 
Foreign bank 
(3) 
5 (9.43%)  20 (27.78%)  87 (11.97%)  17 (16.19%) 
TOTAL  53 (100%)  72 (100%)  727 (100%)  105 (100%) 
 
 
Table 4. Comparison of networked and other firms 
 
  Networked Firms  Others  T-stat 
SME  0.8531  0.9611  . . -14.255* 
Young  0.3683  0.4938  -9.547* 
Private  0.7428  0.8300  -8.021* 
State  0.1030  0.0657  5.044* 
Foreign  0.0752  0.0374  6.167* 
Growth of fixed 
assets 
13.0964  12.4952  0.781 
Research and 
development 
spending 
19.1072  12.8704  . 1.808*** 
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Table 5: Inter-regional Variation in International Property Rights Index (IPRI) 
Indices 
 
REGION  Legal and 
Political 
Environment 
(LP)* 
Physical 
Property 
Rights (PPR)* 
Intellectual 
Property 
Rights (IPR)* 
International 
Property 
Rights Index 
(IPRI)* 
All  
Countries 
4.9  5.6  5.4  5.3 
North America  6.1  6.5  6.7  6.4 
Latin America  3.4  4.7  3.8  4.0 
Africa  3.7  4.4  4.5  4.2 
Middle 
East/North 
Africa 
5.1  5.1  4.8  5.0 
Western Europe  7.2  7.2  7.6  7.4 
Asia/Oceania  5.3  6.2  5.5  5.7 
CEE  countries 
and Russia 
3.5  4.7  4.4  4.2 
 
Source: International Property Rights Index 2007 report study conducted by Alexandra C. Horst, 2006 
Hernando de Soto Fellow.
11  
 
Note: * In all cases, a rank of 1 is lowest (poor) and a rank of 10 is highest (excellent) 
The measure of the Legal and Political environment (LP) was obtained by taking into consideration the 
factors of: judicial independence, confidence in courts, political stability, and corruption. The measure for 
physical property rights (PPR) was obtained by taking into consideration, the factors of: legal protection of 
property rights, registering property, and access to loans. Lastly the measure of Intellectual property rights 
(IPR) was obtained by taking into consideration, the factors of: protection of intellectual property rights, 
patent strength, copyright piracy, trademark protection. 
                                                 
11 Found on UNDP website  http://www.undp.org/legalempowerment/pdf/PRA_Interior_LowRes.pdf  
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Table 6: Institutional quality in sample countries 
 
Notes:[1] Both these indices are obtained from EBRD structural indicators database. The 
values of both these indices range between 0 (minimum) and 4 (maximum). 
 [2] Source: Bacchetta and Drabek (2002) 
 
COUNTRY 
EBRD Bank 
Reform 
Index[1] 
Competition 
Policy Index[1] 
Institutional 
Quality Index[2] 
FYROM (Macedonia)  2.7  2  -3.3 
Serbia and Montenegro  2.7  1  0 
Albania  2.7  2  -7.1 
Croatia  4  2.3  0.3 
Turkey  0  0  0 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  2.7  1  -9.9 
Slovenia  3.3  2.7  8.5 
Poland  3.7  3.3  7 
Hungary  4  3.3  8.7 
Czech rep  4  3  6.8 
Slovak rep  3.7  3.3  2.8 
Romania  3  2.3  -0.8 
Bulgaria  3.7  2.7  0.1 
Latvia  3.7  3  2.6 
Lithuania  3.7  3.3  2.6 
Estonia  4  3.3  6.1   30 
Table 7: List of variables and summary statistics 
 
Variable Names  Variable definitions  Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Source of firm finance 
for New Investment 
Source of firm financing of New Investment. A multi-
coded variable, coded sequentially “0” through to “4”. 
The variable is coded as follows: 
“0” if firm uses  no source of finance 
“1” if firm uses internal finance 
“2” if firm uses Bank finance 
“3” if firm uses non-bank finance. 
“4” if firm uses equity finance 
1.29  1.18 
Firms’ choice of banks 
by ownership type 
Bank choice for bank financing of new investment. 
This is the dependent variable for our multinomial 
logit regression of firm characteristics on bank choice. 
The variable is defined as follows: 
“0” if firm uses  no bank loan 
“1” if firm uses loan from state bank 
“2” if firm uses loan from Private domestic 
commercial Bank 
“3” if firm uses loan from foreign bank 
0.38  0.82 
Small and Medium 
Enterprise 
Small and medium firm size. This is defined as a 
company having a labour force size of  0 -249 
workers.  A dummy variable coded “1” for small or 
medium firms and “0” otherwise. 
0.91  0.29 
Young Firm  Young firm with year of existence beginning on or 
after year 1995.. A dummy variable coded “1” if firm 
is a young firm, and “0” otherwise. Our definition of a 
young firm follows that by Klapper et al (2002) 
0.43  0.50 
Small and Medium 
Enterprises* Young 
firm 
An interaction term derived from the product of the 
variables, Small and Medium enterprises and Young 
firm. 
0.41  0.49 
Growth of Prior year 
fixed assets. 
Growth of firm’s fixed assets in the last year in 
percentage 
12.80  28.83 
State firm   State-owned businesses. A dummy variable coded “1” 
if firm is owned by Government and “0” otherwise 
0.085  0.28 
Foreign firm   Foreign-owned business. A dummy variable coded “1” 
for firms owned by a foreign company and “0” 
otherwise. 
0.057  0.23 
Private domestic firm   Domestic firms owned by local citizens. It comprises 
the sum of the dummy variables of Individual firm 
ownership, Family firm ownership, domestic company 
ownership and general public firm ownership. It is 
thus a dummy variable, with “!” indicating that a firm 
is privately domestically owned, and “0” otherwise. 
0.79  0.41 
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Table 7: List of variables and summary statistics (Contd) 
 
Variable Names  Variable definitions  Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Business Association 
Membership 
Business association membership. A dummy variable 
coded “0” for firms not having business association 
membership and “1” for firms. Possessing business 
association membership. 
0.51  0.50 
Prior year research and 
development spending 
Research and Development spending in the previous 
year. This is a continuous variable measuring the 
amount of Research and development spending by 
firms (in thousands of US dollars). 
16.07  131.01 
Manufacturing sector 
operating firm 
Firms operating in the manufacturing sector. A 
dummy variable coded “0” for firms operating in all 
other sectors and “1” for firms operating in the 
manufacturing sector. 
0.42  0.49 
Competition policy 
index 
An EBRD Country business competition policy index 
ranging from 1.0 to 10.0 with higher values depicting 
highly competitive firms and low values depicting low 
competitive firms. 
2.44  1.06 
Institutional Quality  A country broad composite index of institutional 
quality, comprising five component indicators – 
Government effectiveness, Regulatory burden, Rule of 
law, graft, and extent of democracy (voice and 
accountability) .(see Bacchetta and Drabek (2002),  . 
Values range from values of -25.00 to 25.00 with 
higher values depicting higher quality institutions and 
low values depicting low quality institutions. 
2.66  1.84 
Bank Reform Index  An EBRD index indicating the extent to which 
banking sector reforms have taken place in transition 
countries.  
3.15  1.14  
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Table 8: Model Specifications 
 
 Variable 
Category   Explanatory Variables  Firm financing for 
new investment 
Firm's Bank 
choice 
Firm Size 
Small and Medium 
Enterprises  ￿  ￿ 
   Young firms  ￿  ￿ 
  
Small and Medium 
Enterprises* Young 
firms 
￿  ￿ 
 
Growth of Prior Year 
Fixed Assets  ￿  ￿ 
Firm ownership  State-owned firms  ￿  ￿ 
   Foreign-owned firms  ￿  ￿ 
   Private Domestic firms  ￿  ￿ 
Business sector 
Manufacturing sector 
firm  ￿ 
 
￿ 
Business 
Association 
Firms membership of 
business association 
￿  ￿ 
Research And 
Development 
Prior Year Research and 
Development Spending 
￿  ￿ 
Country-level 
institutional 
variables 
competition Policy index  ￿ 
 
  
Institutional Quality 
Index  ￿  ￿ 
  
EBRD Bank Reform 
index    ￿  
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Diagnostic Statistics: 
Log likelihood Function: -7659.354                                         Restricted Log-likelihood: -7970.828    
Chi Squared: 622.9477                                                                                                           Prob     (Chisqd>Value): 0.0000000 
Degrees of Freedom: 48. 
  Table 9: Multinomial Logit Marginal Effects of Firms’ Financing  
(instrumented Business Association membership) 
T-Statistics are provided in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
 
 
 
 
 
      Firm Source of Finance    
Explanatory Variables  Internal Finance  Bank Finance  Non-Bank Credit  Equity Finance 
Constant 
0.0901 
(1.272) 
-0.153 
(3.338)*** 
-0.160 
(4.092)*** 
0.0449 
(1.402) 
Predicted value of Business Association 
Membership 
-0.0288 
(O.474)   
0.0766 
(1.896)* 
0.0299   
(0.923) 
-0.0637 
  (2.224)** 
State Firm 
0.0423 
(1.195)   
-0.133   
(5.099)*** 
-0.0500 
(2.339)** 
-0.00313  
 (0.186) 
Foreign Firm 
0.0664 
(1.473) 
-0.0747  
(2.534)** 
-0.00641 
(0.264) 
0.0390 
  (2.208)** 
Private Domestic Firm 
0.0169 
(0.641)   
-0.0237  
(1.498) 
-0.0152 
  (1.006) 
0.0154  
 (1.203) 
Manufacturing sector contribution to sales 
0.0187 
(1.351)   
0.0583  
(6.394)*** 
-0.0176  
 (2.074)** 
0.00804 
  (1.457) 
Growth of Prior Year Fixed Assets 
0.000264 
(1.117) 
0.000318  
(2.282)** 
0.000170  
 (1.032) 
-0.0000687  
(0.625) 
Prior Year Research and Development 
Spending 
0.0000701 
(1.248)   
0.0000319  
(1.066) 
-0.0000494  
().995) 
-0.0000140  
(0.559) 
Small and Medium Enterprises 
0.0929  
 (3.238)*** 
-0.0530  
(3.058)* 
-0.0671  
 (4.551)*** 
-0.0106 
  (0.945) 
Young firms 
0.0239  
 (0.420) 
0.0358  
 (1.118) 
-0.0186 
  (0.617) 
0.00292  
 (0.143) 
Small and Medium Enterprises* Young firms 
-0.0620  
 (0.766) 
0.0184  
 (0.368) 
0.0458  
 (1.064) 
-0.0489  
 (1.408) 
EBRD competition Policy index 
0.0244  
 (2.726)*** 
0.0274  
(4.108)*** 
0.0527  
 (7.466)*** 
-0.0432  
(15.492)*** 
Institutional Quality Index 
-0.00440  
(2.376)** 
-0.00533  
(4.267)*** 
-0.00208  
(1.648)* 
0.0112   
(13.164)***  
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T-Statistics are provided in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level 
Table 10: Multinomial Logit Marginal Effects for Firms’ Choice of Banks 
(instrumented Business Association membership) 
T-Statistics are provided in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      Type Of Bank    
Explanatory Variables  State Bank 
Private Domestic Commercial 
Bank  Foreign Bank 
Constant 
-0.0740 
(3.231)*** 
-0.175 
(3.659)*** 
-0.0961 
(6.978)*** 
Predicted value of Business Association 
Membership 
0.0137  
(0.663) 
-0.00405 
(0.096) 
0.0311 
 (3.283)*** 
State firm 
-0.0147  
(1.661)* 
-0.120 
(4.777)*** 
-0.0318  
(3.504)*** 
Foreign firm 
-0.0305  
(2.184)** 
-0.0279 
(1.019) 
-0.00682   
(0.860) 
Private Domestic firms 
-0.0106  
(1.740)* 
-0.0155 
(0.948) 
-0.00474  
(0.979) 
Growth of Prior Year Fixed Assets 
0.0000566  
(1.012) 
0.000330 
(2.425)** 
0.00000890  
(0.179) 
Prior Year Research and Development Spending 
0.00000650  
(0.851) 
-0.00000656 
(0.181) 
0.00000247  
(0.226) 
Small and Medium Enterprises 
-0.00788 
02(1.159) 
-0.0713 
(4.320)*** 
-0.0205  
(4.193)*** 
Young firms 
0.00507  
(0.395) 
-0.0297 
(0.849) 
0.0131  
(1.824)* 
Small and Medium Enterprises* Young firms 
0.00315  
(0.131) 
0.000659 
(0.012) 
0.0137   
(1.246) 
EBRD Bank Reform index 
0.000275  
(0.118) 
0.0283 
(5.042)*** 
0.0114 
(4.472)*** 
Institutional Quality Index 
0.00254  
(4.967)*** 
-0.00186 
(1.718)* 
-0.00254  
(8.088)*** 
Diagnostic Statistics: 
Log likelihood Function: -3409.683                                                             Restricted Log-likelihood: -3540.975  
Chi Squared: 262.5828                                                                              Prob     (Chisqd>Value): 0.0000000 
Degrees of Freedom: 33  
 
35 
 
Table 11. Logit Fixed Effects Estimates (marginal effects) of Firm’s Choice of Banks 
 
   Loans from 
Variables   Domestic banks  Foreign banks 
Business association 
membership 
0.16 (1.804)*   0.26 (1.958)*  
Growth of fixed assets  -0.07 (1.119)   -0.06 (0.451)  
Institutions*Business 
association 
-0.01 (1.063)   -0.03(1.131) 
Log-L  -110.9280   -31.7417  
T-Statistics are provided in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level 
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Diagnostic Statistics: 
Log likelihood Function:    -3734.628                  Restricted Log-likelihood:  -3877.561 
Chi Squared: 285.8667                                                   Prob     (Chisqd>Value): 0.000000 
APPENDIX 
 
Table A1. Probit estimates (Marginal effects) of a firm’s affiliation to business 
association 
 
 
Explanatory Variables  Probit Regression Estimates (Marginal 
Effects) 
Constant  0.358 
(10.292)***  
State Firm  -0.00409 
(0.117)      
Foreign Firm  0.107 
(2.863)***  
Private Domestic Firm  -0.0362 
(1.383)   
Small and Medium Enterprises  -0.278 
(13.058)*** 
Young Firm  -0.105    
(7.591)*** 
T-Statistics are provided in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level  
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Diagnostic Statistics: 
Log likelihood Function:    -7616.301                                                                              Restricted Log-likelihood:  -7970.828 
Chi Squared: 709.0536                                                                                                    Prob     (Chisqd>Value): 0.000000 
  Table A2: Multinomial Logit Marginal Effects of Firms’ Financing  
(business association not instrumented) 
T-Statistics are provided in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      Firm Source of Finance    
Explanatory Variables  Internal Finance  Bank Finance  Non-Bank Credit  Equity Finance 
Constant 
0.125 
(2.775)*** 
-0.157    
(5.632)*** 
-0.193    
(7.295)*** 
-0.0161 
(0.888) 
Business Association Membership 
-0.0513 
(3.540)*** 
0.0664 
(6.884)*** 
0.0508 
(5.960)*** 
0.00106 
(0.171) 
State Firm 
0.0396 
(1.116) 
-0.129 
(4.997)*** 
-0.0484 
(2.294)** 
-0.00474 
(0.277) 
Foreign Firm 
0.0596 
(1.555) 
-0.0551 
(2.279)** 
-0.00251 
(0.122) 
0.0204 
(1.216) 
Private Domestic Firm 
0.0154 
(0.580) 
-0.0224 
(1.425) 
-0.0136 
(0.914) 
0.0165 
(1.272) 
Manufacturing sector  
0.0195 
(1.399) 
0.0557 
(6.157)*** 
-0.0178 
(2.125)** 
0.00804 
(1.438) 
Growth of Prior Year Fixed Assets 
0.000274 
(1.152) 
0.000303 
(2.194)** 
0.000161 
(1.245) 
-0.0000722 
(0.647) 
Prior Year Research and Development 
Spending 
0.0000743 
(1.322) 
0.0000247 
(0.841) 
-0.0000522 
(1.065) 
-0.0000146 
(0.572) 
Small and Medium Enterprises 
0.0784 
(2.725)*** 
-0.0337 
(1.961)** 
-0.0525 
(3.590)*** 
-0.0145 
(1.283) 
Young firms 
 0.0222  
(0.390) 
0.0387 
(1.218) 
-0.0151 
(0.507) 
0.00403 
(0.195) 
Small and Medium Enterprises* Young firms 
-0.0398 
(0.679) 
-0.0493 
(1.485) 
0.0204 
(0.658) 
0.0113 
(0.526) 
EBRD competition Policy index 
0.0172 
(1.856)* 
0.0371 
(5.530)*** 
0.0608 
(8.607)*** 
-0.0435 
(14.379)*** 
Institutional Quality Index 
-0.00448 
(2.412)** 
-0.00531 
(4.345)*** 
-0.00238 
(1.931)* 
0.0114 
(13.067)***  
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Table A3: Multinomial Logit Marginal Effects for Firms’ Choice of Banks  
(business association not instrumented) 
T-Statistics are provided in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      Type Of Bank    
Explanatory Variables  State Bank 
Private Domestic Commercial 
Bank  Foreign Bank 
Constant 
-0.756 
(6.253)*** 
-0.259 
(9.127)*** 
-0.0824 
(7.681)*** 
Business Association Membership 
0.0128 
(3.321)** 
0.0681 
(7.215)** 
0.0178 
(5.330)*** 
State firm 
-0.0143 
(1.652)* 
-0.118 
(4.759)*** 
-0.0280 
(3.237)** 
Foreign firm 
-0.0265 
(2.387)** 
-0.0366 
(1.532) 
0.00355 
(0.600) 
Private Domestic firms 
-0.00992 
(1.664)* 
-0.0131 
(0.812) 
-0.00464 
(1.012) 
Growth of Prior Year Fixed Assets 
0.0000516 
(0.937) 
0.000308 
(2.287)** 
0.00000747 
(0.160) 
Prior Year Research and Development Spending 
0.00000526 
(0.705) 
-0.0000127 
(0.354) 
0.000000227 
(0.022) 
Small and Medium Enterprises 
-0.00435 
(0.650) 
-0.0540 
(3.312)*** 
-0.0136 
(2.958)*** 
Young firms 
0.00570 
(0.453) 
-0.0232 
(0.669) 
0.0125 
(1.822)* 
Small and Medium Enterprises* Young firms 
-0.00912 
(0.690) 
0.00703 
(0.195) 
-0.0111 
(1.467) 
EBRD Bank Reform index 
0.00200 
(0.862) 
0.0355 
(6.378)*** 
0.0116 
(4.982)*** 
Institutional Quality Index 
0.00242 
(4.898)*** 
-0.00149 
(1.405) 
-0.00219 
(7.073)*** 
Diagnostic Statistics: 
Log likelihood Function:   -3366.185                                                             Restricted Log-likelihood: -3540.975 
Chi Squared: 349.5789                                                                                   Prob     (Chisqd>Value): 0.0000000 
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Table A4. Probit Random Effects Estimates (marginal effects) of Bank Choice  
 
  
Loans from 
 
Descriptive  
statistics 
Descriptive  
statistics 
Explanatory Variables 
Private Domestic 
Commercial Bank 
Foreign 
Bank 
Means  Standard  
Deviation 
Constant 
-2.060 
 (7.100)***   
-2.49       
(3.781)*** 
N/a  N/a 
Business Association Membership  
0.235    
(2.466)** 
0.344       
(2.249)** 
0.38        0.48       
State firm 
-0.196  
(0.913)     
-0.601       
(1.524) 
0.045  0.21 
Foreign firm 
-0.0603 
(0.286)     
0.0420      
(0.182) 
0.091    0.29       
Private Domestic firms 
0.176 
 (1.292) 
-0.252       
(1.296) 
0.67        0.47       
Growth of Prior Year Fixed Assets 
0.000195 
(1.695)* 
-0.00282  
(0.126) 
17.82        37.64       
Prior Year Research and Development 
Spending
+ 
0.198     
   (1.89)* 
0.285       
(1.716)* 
0.23        0.42       
Small and Medium Enterprises 
-0.410 
(2.629)*** 
-0.208        
(0.906) 
0.87        0.34       
Young firms 
0.216 
 (0.588) 
0.608       
(1.638) 
0.32        0.47       
Small and Medium Enterprises* Young 
firms 
-0.209 
(0.544) 
-0.483 
 (1.236) 
0.32        0.47       
EBRD Bank Reform index 
0.258 
(3.577)*** 
0.234       
(1.284) 
3.16        0.91       
Institutional Quality Index 
-0.0131 
(0.984) 
-0.0539   
(3.058)*** 
2.51  4.49 
RHO 
0.30 
(3.904)*** 
0.035 
(0.125) 
N/a  N/a 
Diagnostic Statistics: 
Log Likelihood Function  -660.4499       -215.1756     
N/a  N/a 
Restricted log-likelihood  -685.5385       -233.4515 
N/a  N/a 
Chi squared  50.17728***      36.55164***   
N/a  N/a 
T-Statistics are provided in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level 
+  Dummy  variable  (with  1  denoting  firm  having  R&D  spending;  and  0  denoting  otherwise)  for  prior  year  research  and 
development spending employed in this regression  as absolute value for actual R&D Spending of the firms was not available 
for BEEPS 2002 